Two studies investigated the relationship between working memory capacity (WMC), adult age, and the resolution of conflict between familiarity and recollection in short-term recognition tasks. Experiment 1 showed a specific deficit of young adults with low WMC in rejecting intrusion probes (i.e., highly familiar probes) in a modified Sternberg task, which was similar to the deficit found in old adults in a parallel experiment (K. Oberauer, 2001) . Experiment 2 generalized these results to 3 recognition paradigms (modified Sternberg, local recognition, and n back tasks). Old adults showed disproportional performance deficits on intrusion probes only in terms of reaction times, whereas young adults with low WMC showed them only in terms of errors. The generality of the effect across paradigms is more compatible with a deficit in content-context bindings subserving recollection than with a deficit in inhibition of irrelevant information in working memory. Structural equation models showed that WMC is related to the efficiency of recollection but not of familiarity.
Three decades after the seminal article by Baddeley and Hitch (1974) popularizing the concept of working memory, there is no agreement about its precise characterization. The consensus view seems to be that working memory is a system that provides temporary access to a select set of representations for manipulation (Miyake & Shah, 1999) . There is also agreement that this system has limited capacity, meaning that only a limited amount of information can be maintained ready for access at any time. The concept of limited capacity is an abstract construct invoked to explain the systematic decline of performance with increasing task complexity (e.g., Halford, Wilson, & Phillips, 1998; Oberauer & Kliegl, 2001 ) as well as the substantial amount of shared variance in factor analytic studies of complex tasks (e.g., Oberauer, Sü␤, Schulze, Wilhelm, & Wittmann, 2000) . Measures of working memory capacity (WMC) are among the main correlates of individual differences in complex cognitive tasks such as reasoning ability, reading comprehension, or learning a complex skill (for a review, see Feldman Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004) . Likewise, reduced WMC has been identified as a major determinant, besides general mental speed, of cognitive decline in old age (e.g., Salthouse, 1992) .
There is little consensus about how exactly the capacity limit of working memory is to be characterized and what is responsible for it. Researchers interested in individual differences or age differences in WMC have proposed various sources for these differences, among them limited resources to be shared between temporary maintenance and concurrent processing (Daily, Lovett, & Reder, 2001; Just & Carpenter, 1992) , time-based decay (Towse, Hitch, & Hutton, 2000) , interference between elements held in working memory simultaneously (Oberauer & Kliegl, 2001) , and attentional functions such as the ability to inhibit irrelevant information (Hasher, Zacks, & May, 1999) or a general ability to control attention (Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999) . In this article I investigate two proposals about the nature of individual and age differences in WMC.
One is the hypothesis, advanced by Hasher and Zacks (1988; Hasher et al., 1999) , that the ability to inhibit irrelevant information is a crucial factor for an individual's effective WMC. In particular, old adults are assumed to have difficulties on tasks with high working memory demand because they fail to inhibit representations they no longer need, and as a consequence, their working memories are cluttered with irrelevant material. Support for this hypothesis comes from numerous studies showing that old adults' cognitive processes are influenced more than those of young adults by information that is no longer relevant (Stoltzfus, Hasher, & Zacks, 1996) . Research on children with reading difficulties suggests that an inhibition deficit could also be related to individual differences in WMC within an age group (De Beni, Palladino, Pazzaglia, & Cornoldi, 1998) .
The other hypothetical source of WMC I investigate here is a limited capacity for binding together component representations. Binding between features to form objects in working memory has recently received increased attention (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Wheeler & Treisman, 2002) . Several studies have demonstrated a specific problem in old adults with respect to memorizing bindings between content and context information, such as those between objects and their spatial locations or between words and the list they were in (Hedden & Park, 2003; Henkel, Johnson, & De Leonardis, 1998) . On the basis of an analysis of task demands of various indicators of WMC and reasoning ability, my colleagues and I (Oberauer, Sü␤, Wilhelm, & Sander, in press) proposed that the capacity to establish and maintain bindings in working memory might be the common limiting factor of all these tasks, thereby explaining the substantial amount of variance shared among them in studies of individual differences.
The inhibition hypothesis and the binding hypothesis can be invoked to explain a highly overlapping set of findings. When a person fails to remove some irrelevant content from working memory, or fails to restrain its access to working memory, this failure can be due either to a lack of inhibitory powers or to a deficit in representing which content is relevant and which content is irrelevant for the task at hand. In many laboratory tasks, the information discriminating between relevant and irrelevant representations lies not in their content but only in their binding to a context. This can be illustrated with a study using a modified version of the Sternberg (1969) recognition task, designed to investigate the removal of irrelevant information from working memory (Oberauer, 2001) . In each trial participants memorized two brief lists of words, distinguished by their position on the screen as well as their color. Following this, a color cue appeared, indicating which of the lists was relevant for the trial. From this moment the other list could be forgotten. After a variable cuestimulus interval (CSI), a probe appeared that had to be compared to the elements in the relevant list only. Both young and old adults showed substantially increased latencies in rejecting probes from the irrelevant list (called intrusion probes), compared with new probes not seen in any list. Old adults showed a specific, disproportional increase in these intrusion costs relative to young adults. This could mean that old adults are less able to inhibit the representations of elements in the irrelevant list. Alternatively, it could mean that old adults are less efficient in discriminating between elements from the relevant and the irrelevant list. The latter interpretation points to a deficit in the bindings between list elements and their list context (i.e., their color or their spatial position). One goal of the present work was to distinguish between these two possibilities.
A second goal was to investigate to what extent individual differences in WMC within one age group can be used as a model for the effects of aging on short-term recognition. To this end, I provide a direct comparison of the age contrast and the individualdifferences contrast on the same experimental paradigms within the same study. This approach starts to test a hypothesis that is often implicitly assumed, namely, that deficits in WMC observed in different groups, such as lower capacity young adults, old adults, children, or certain special populations, reflect the same underlying source of differences. Groups with equivalent levels of WMC as measured by standard test procedures such as reading span (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980) do not necessarily show the same pattern of results when tested with experimental paradigms designed to isolate hypothetical variables underlying WMC, such as the ability to divide attention, inhibition, or the robustness of bindings. For example, it could be the case that old adults have problems with working memory tasks because of their reduced ability to inhibit irrelevant information, whereas young adults with low WMC scores have deficits in bindings-or vice versa (for a comprehensive overview of various group contrasts in working memory functions, see Conway, Jarrold, Kane, Miyake, & Towse, in press; Engle, Sedek, von Hecker, & McIntosh, in press) .
My third goal in this work was to investigate the link between experimental paradigms used to investigate working memory in different research traditions. In research on individual differences, the most frequently used tasks are so-called complex span tasks such as reading span (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980) , counting span (Case, Kurland, & Goldberg, 1982) , or operation span (Turner & Engle, 1989) , which combine a serial recall task with a concurrent processing demand. Meanwhile, the scope of WMC as an individual-differences construct has been extended to other types of tasks (Oberauer et al., 2000) , but still, most of them rely on some form of recall. In cognitive neuroscience research, on the other hand, various recognition paradigms have emerged as the main workhorses for research on working memory (for reviews, see Fletcher & Henson, 2001 ; E. E. Smith & Jonides, 1997) .
Research on the aging of working memory also has used recognition paradigms (e.g., Hartley, Speer, Jonides, Reuter-Lorenz, & Smith, 2001; Hedden & Park, 2003; Oberauer, 2001; Zacks, Radvansky, & Hasher, 1996) . It is still unclear, however, whether these recognition paradigms reflect the same cognitive functions and the same capacity limit (or limits) as the complex span tasks mostly used to measure WMC.
The theoretical background of this study is a model of working memory that distinguishes two embedded components (Cowan, 1995 (Cowan, , 1999 Oberauer, 2002) . One is the activated part of longterm memory (LTM), in which representations can be activated through perception or spread of activation. The other, central component of working memory 1 holds a limited number of independent elements directly accessible for ongoing operations. I assume that the main function of the central component is to build and maintain new bindings between existing representational elements, thereby forming new structures. The capacity limit of working memory is assumed to reflect a limit on this binding function. Several bindings maintained simultaneously compete with each other and thereby limit the number of independent elements, and relations between them, that can be held in the central component of working memory (for speculation about the neural basis of this capacity limit, see Usher, Cohen, Haarman, & Horn, 2000) .
I assume that the two embedded components of working memory provide two sources of information in short-term recognition tasks. First, each probe is matched quickly, automatically, and in parallel to all representations in the activated part of LTM, returning a strength signal that reflects the degree to which the probe matches highly activated LTM representations. Second, the probe is compared by a slower process to representations maintained in 1 Cowan (1995 Cowan ( , 1999 the more central component of working memory. This comparison makes use of the bindings between content and context representations and therefore provides information as to whether the probe has been encountered in a specific context (e.g., that it has been presented in the most recent trial in the upper list in red ink). Following Atkinson, Herrmann, and Wescourt (1974) , I call the first source of information familiarity and the second one recollection. The nature of familiarity and recollection in recognition is a matter of ongoing debate (see, e.g., Yonelinas, 2002) , and it might even depend on the task (Gruppuso, Lindsay, & Kelley, 1997) . There is good evidence, however, for the two processes described above in short-term recognition paradigms (Atkinson et al., 1974; Monsell, 1978; Oberauer, 2001) , and their characteristics closely match the common core of the concepts familiarity and recollection as used by most authors, so the use of these terms seems justified. This does not imply that familiarity and recollection can always be mapped onto the two components of my working memory model, regardless of the task paradigm through which they are assessed.
In many recognition paradigms, among them the standard Sternberg (1969) task, familiarity is a good cue for recognition, because a representation's activation is highly correlated with the recency of its use. In others, however, probes to be accepted and probes to be rejected can have highly similar or even equal levels of familiarity. I call these the conflict paradigms, because they establish a conflict between familiarity and recollection. The modified Sternberg task (Oberauer, 2001) introduced above is one example: Elements from the relevant and from the irrelevant list have been encoded with equal strength at the same time. Until the cue is presented that indicates which list is the relevant one, they will be equally activated. This creates a conflict for the intrusion probes (i.e., probes from the irrelevant list), because they elicit high familiarity but have to be rejected on the basis of recollection. Another instance of a conflict recognition task is the opposition procedure introduced by Jennings and Jacoby (1997) .
The interplay of familiarity and recollection can be understood in a framework that models the recognition decision as the result of gradual accumulation of evidence for each possible response (e.g., Ratcliff, 1978) . In the case of an intrusion probe, the familiarity signal provides evidence for a yes response, whereas recollection provides evidence for a no response. The recollection process is assumed to start later but to provide stronger evidence that eventually can overcome the evidence from familiarity. The time to overcome the response tendency produced by the misleading familiarity signal is reflected in intrusion costs on reaction times (RTs). Intrusion costs in terms of errors result when an intrusion probe is accepted on the basis of familiarity, either because recollection fails or because the response is given too fast for the recollection process to catch up and turn around the response tendency.
As argued above, there are two (not mutually exclusive) ways of efficiently reducing intrusion costs in the modified Sternberg task. One is to reduce the misleading familiarity of irrelevant list elements by inhibiting them as quickly as possible after the cue. The other is to use binding information to accumulate evidence from recollection quickly and reliably. Therefore, both the inhibition hypothesis and the binding hypothesis lead to the prediction that older adults will have difficulties in the modified Sternberg task, in particular in rejecting intrusion probes-just as was observed (Oberauer, 2001) . Likewise, both hypotheses lead to the prediction that young adults with low WMC will experience the same difficulties. A test of this prediction is provided by Experiment 1. Experiment 2 represents an attempt to distinguish between the two hypotheses.
In summary, the work presented here aims to answer three questions. One is whether, in the context of conflict paradigms of short-term recognition, individuals with low WMC will display the same profile of selective deficits relative to individuals with high WMC as old adults do in comparison to young adults. The second question is to what extent recognition paradigms reflect the same processes and the same limiting factors as are reflected in standard measures of WMC. The third question is whether the inhibition hypothesis or the binding hypothesis provides a better account for individual and group differences in performance on the recognition paradigms, and-to the degree that the second question can be answered positively-for differences in WMC in general. Experiment 1 targeted the first two questions with a single paradigm, the modified Sternberg task; Experiment 2 addressed all three issues with a broader set of experimental paradigms.
Experiment 1
The first experiment is an exact replication of the age comparative study with the modified Sternberg task (Oberauer, 2001 , Experiment 1) with young adults differing in WMC. Participants were tested on four working memory tasks validated in two large factor analytic studies (Oberauer et al., 2000; Oberauer, Sü␤, Wilhelm, & Wittmann, 2003) . The experimental task was the modified Sternberg task described above, with the set sizes of both lists varied independently. I used a large range of CSIs to trace the time course of two indicators of successful forgetting of the irrelevant list. One of these indicators is the size of the intrusion costs, defined as the difference in RTs and error rates between rejection of intrusion probes and rejection of new probes. The other is the set-size effect of the irrelevant list on RTs.
The two indicators can be interpreted as reflecting the removal of the irrelevant list from the two components of the working memory model introduced above. As long as a list (or set) is held in the central component, it places a load on the system's limited capacity, and therefore its size should have an effect on RTs to the probes. This, I assume, generates the slope of RTs over set size observed routinely since Sternberg (1969) . To the degree that the irrelevant set is removed from the central component of working memory, the effect of its size should diminish. Intrusion costs, on the other hand, reflect the remaining activation of the irrelevant list in LTM, which generates the misleading familiarity signal in response to intrusion probes.
In my previous age-comparative study (Oberauer, 2001) , the set-size effect of the irrelevant list declined to a nonsignificant level quickly after the cue for both young and old adults. The intrusion cost on RTs, in contrast, remained substantial even for the longest CSI (5 s) and was much larger for old than for young adults. This pattern suggests that both age groups were highly efficient in removing the irrelevant list from the central part of the working memory system. On the other hand, representations of the irrelevant list elements remained activated in LTM for several seconds. I previously interpreted the age difference in intrusion costs as evidence for an inhibition deficit in old adults (in agree-ment with the interpretation Zacks et al., 1996 , proposed earlier for a related finding). As argued above, however, increased intrusion costs on RTs could also arise from reduced availability or accessibility of bindings, which impairs recollection and thereby gives the fast familiarity process more opportunity to drive response selection in the wrong direction.
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to investigate whether the WMC contrast (i.e., the comparison of people with high vs. low capacity within the same age group) elicits the same pattern as the age contrast in the modified Sternberg task: equivalence in the speed of reducing irrelevant-set size effects to zero, equivalence also in the relevant-set size effect, but increased intrusion effects in individuals with less efficient cognitive functions.
Method Participants
Participants were 120 high school students from Potsdam, Germany. Their mean age was 17.5 years, ranging from 17 to 19 years, and 66 of them were female. They participated in three 1-hr sessions and were reimbursed with 10 Deutsche marks (about $5) per session. One participant did not complete one of the sessions and therefore was excluded from the analyses, leaving N ϭ 119.
Materials and Procedure
Measures of working memory capacity. In the first session participants were tested on four tasks to measure WMC: reading span, memory updating 2 (MU) numerical, MU spatial, and spatial short-term memory (SSTM). These tasks were taken from a previous study (Oberauer et al., 2000) , in which two of them-reading span and MU numerical-had high loadings on a verbal-numerical factor, whereas the other two-SSTM and MU spatial-had high loadings on a spatial working memory factor.
In the reading span tasks, participants read short sentences presented for 4 s each on the computer screen; decided whether the sentence was true or false; and tried to memorize the last word, which was always a noun. After a number of sentences, participants wrote down the words they remembered in their order of presentation. Lists of sentences with increasing length (four to seven sentences) were presented in successive trials, for a total of 11 trials.
In the two MU tasks, participants saw between two and six rectangular frames on the screen. In each frame, an initial element was presented. In the numerical version, this was a digit; in the spatial version it was a dot appearing in one of nine possible locations within its frame. In the numerical version, the initial values were updated by a sequence of simple arithmetic operations presented in individual frames. At the end of a trial, participants recalled for each frame the value reached after all updating steps. In the spatial MU task, no updating operations were required. There were 11 trials for MU spatial and 14 for MU numerical.
In each trial of the SSTM task, a set of dots was presented one by one, for 1 s each, in a 10 ϫ 10 grid on the screen. Participants tried to remember the locations of the dots and, at the end of the series, attempted to reproduce their pattern in an empty grid. The number of dots in each set increased from two to six, for a total of 15 trials. For details on the procedure for the four working memory tasks, I refer readers to the description in Oberauer et al. (2000) .
Modified Sternberg task. In the second and third sessions, participants worked on seven blocks of the modified Sternberg task (three blocks in one session and four in the other). In each trial, two lists of words had to be remembered. List length of both lists was varied in a 2 ϫ 2 orthogonal design within each block; each list consisted of either one word or three words. Within each block of 64 trials, the words in the memory lists were sampled without replacement from a set of 400 one-and two-syllable German nouns. 3 The new probes were sampled with replacement from the same set. Thus, within a block, none of the memory list words were ever repeated, and new probes were rarely repeated.
On each trial, participants first saw the two lists simultaneously on the computer screen, one above the other, for 1.3 s times the number of words. The upper list was presented in blue, and the lower list in red, on a black background. A rectangular frame, selected at random to be either red or blue, was presented centrally 800 ms after the memory lists disappeared. This frame indicated by its color which of the two lists would be the relevant list. This was followed after a variable CSI by a probe word displayed in the frame in the same color as the frame. Participants responded to the probes by pressing either the left arrow key (for no) or the right arrow key (for yes) on the computer keyboard. They were instructed to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. Accuracy feedback was provided after each response in the form of a small circle displayed for 500 ms in green (correct) or red (incorrect). There were three types of probes. Half of the probes were positive, that is, they were words from the relevant list and therefore had to be accepted. The other half of the probes had to be rejected. Half of them were new words that never occurred as an element of the memory list in the whole block. The other half consisted of intrusion probes, that is, words from the irrelevant list.
Probe type, as well as list length, was varied in a random order within blocks, whereas CSI was varied between blocks. Six blocks corresponded to the six levels of CSI: 100 ms, 300 ms, 600 ms, 1 s, 2.5 s, and 5 s. In the seventh block, all memory items, as well as the cue and the probe, were presented in white, and participants always had to compare the probe to both lists. This block, which essentially corresponds to the original Sternberg task, served as a baseline condition. For the sake of brevity, data from the baseline block are not reported. The order of blocks was counterbalanced across participants. Each block consisted of 12 practice trials and 64 test trials. Participants were free to take short breaks between the blocks.
Results
RTs of correct responses were used for analysis. Outliers, which were defined as times exceeding an individual's mean in a block by more than 3 standard deviations, were trimmed to the cutoff value; this affected 1.66% of all times. RTs were averaged within each design cell and log transformed for statistical analyses. Besides yielding distributions that are closer to normal distributions, this procedure serves to turn proportional differences into additive differences. Moving to a proportional measurement scale is necessary because individual differences in latencies, as well as age differences, can best be described by a proportional model (Zheng, Myerson, & Hale, 2000) . Therefore, the most reasonable baseline model of individual and group differences is one in which latencies of one person or group relate to those of another person or group by a constant proportional factor across different conditions. Every hypothesis that one group is specifically slowed relative to the other in one condition must be tested against this baseline. The log transformation turns the proportional differences expected from the baseline model into additive effects, so that interactions be-tween group and condition can safely be interpreted as a disproportional deviation of one group in one condition.
A composite WMC score was computed for each participant by averaging the z scores on the four working memory tasks. Because of computer failure, no data from the two MU tasks were available for 2 participants; their composite scores were based on the other two working memory tasks. Because WMC is a continuous variable, I used correlation coefficients and analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to statistically test its association with the experimental dependent variables. To make interactions between design variables and WMC more transparent and more comparable to the age contrasts in Oberauer (2001) , I divided the sample by median split into a high-WMC group and a low-WMC group for presentation in the figures. For the same reason, the figures show the nontransformed RTs. In addition, the figures show the corresponding data of the old adults from Oberauer (2001, Experiment 1) for a direct comparison. For all statistical tests in this article, I adopted an alpha level of .05 for significance. For statistics with p Ͻ .001, the probability value is not reported. The effect size is given as partial eta squared ( p 2 ), which reflects the sum of squares of the effect in question divided by the total of the effect and error sum of squares.
Set-Size Effects
RTs. Appendix A provides a summary of the RTs by set sizes, CSI, and WMC group. The first analysis focuses on set-size effects and how they develop over increasing CSIs. The CSI factor was coded as a linear contrast, which captures monotonic trends with maximal statistical power while ignoring nonlinear tendencies that are of little theoretical interest. Log-transformed RTs were submitted to an ANCOVA with CSI, relevant-set size, and irrelevantset size as within-subject factors and WMC as the covariate. The significant effects are summarized in Table 1 . Of most theoretical interest is the effect of irrelevant-set size, which was significant overall and showed a gradual decline over CSI, as indicated by the interaction of irrelevant-set size with the linear contrast of CSI. This interaction was not modified by WMC, indicating that the decline of irrelevant-set size over CSI did not vary with levels of WMC. Individual t tests at the six levels of CSI showed that the irrelevant-set size effect was significant only for the first two CSIs (t ϭ 4.04 and 5.14, respectively; for these and all subsequently reported ts in this experiment, df ϭ 118), and marginal for the CSI of 0.6 s (t ϭ 1.92, p ϭ .057) but not significant for the CSIs of 1 s and larger (all ts Ͻ 1.1). The irrelevant-set size effect was consistently reduced to zero about 1 s after the cue for both high-and low-WMC individuals (see Figure 1) , indicating that the removal of the irrelevant list from the capacity-limited part of working memory occurred quickly regardless of WMC. It should be noted that when the present sample of young adults was compared statistically with the previous sample of old adults, the linear contrast of CSI interacted with age, F(1, 141) ϭ 4.9, p ϭ .028, p 2 ϭ .03, reflecting a steeper decline of irrelevant-set size effects over CSI in the young adults. The difference from my previous analysis (Oberauer, 2001) could be due to the new (and larger) sample of young adults or to the use of a linear contrast to code the CSI effect.
Unsurprisingly, the relevant-set size effect was significant. Although the two capacity groups differed in overall speed (as shown by the significant main effect of the WMC covariate in Table 1 ), their relevant-set size effects were the same on an absolute measurement scale. The relevant-set size effect of low-WMC individuals therefore was less than would be expected from proportional slowing (see the top panel of Figure 2 ). This is reflected in the significant interaction of relevant-set size with WMC on the logtransformed RTs, which disappeared when the nontransformed RTs were used as the dependent variable (F Ͻ 1).
Accuracy. An analogous ANCOVA was conducted with the proportion of correct responses. The results, also shown in Table 1 , match those for the RTs in most respects. High WMC was associated with higher accuracy (r ϭ .37). Trials with a relevant-set size of one word were responded to more accurately than those with a relevant-set size of three words (90% vs. 93% correct), and the same was true for irrelevant-set sizes (90% vs. 92%). Both effects were slightly modulated by CSI. Different from the RT data, the irrelevant-set size effect on errors did not decline linearly over CSI. A gradual decline from a 3% effect at the shortest CSI Note. p 2 is the effect size in terms of proportion of variance explained. All interactions with cue-stimulus interval (CSI) involve the linear contrast of that factor. WMC ϭ working memory capacity. to 0.5% at the CSI of 2.5 was followed by an increase back to 3% on the CSI of 5 s. This is reflected in t tests for successive CSIs (t ϭ 3.9, 3.1, 1.6, 1.6, 0.18, and 4.1 for increasing CSIs). This effect was not modulated by WMC (all F ratios for the relevant interactions Ͻ 1.1). I have no explanation for the reappearing effect of irrelevant-set size at the longest CSI.
The failure to observe an effect of WMC on the decline of irrelevant-set sizes over CSI could be due simply to a lack of reliability of this effect. Difference scores often suffer from low reliability, and the effect in question is a difference of differences. The data from Experiment 1 provide a large enough sample to test for reliability. To this end, I computed linear contrasts of the irrelevant-set size effects over CSI for each participant, separately for relevant-set sizes of one and three. Cronbach's alpha for these two variables was .38 for the contrast based on RTs and .51 for the contrast based on accuracies. Thus, the failure to find individual differences in the reduction of irrelevant-set size effects over CSI could be due to a lack of reliability. Likewise, the fact that age differences in this effect were not significant, at least in some studies or comparisons (Oberauer, 2001 (Oberauer, , 2005 , could be due to low reliability of the relevant contrast.
Intrusion Costs
RTs. Figure 3 shows the intrusion costs in RTs as a function of CSI. Intrusion costs were computed as the difference between (log-transformed) RTs to intrusion probes and RTs to new probes. I submitted the intrusion costs to an ANCOVA with CSI and relevant-set size as within-subject factors and WMC as the covariate. Low-WMC individuals had disproportionately large intrusion costs, as reflected by a significant main effect of the WMC covariate, F(1, 117) ϭ 11.04, p 2 ϭ .09, p ϭ .001. The correlation between WMC and the intrusion costs, averaged across all other design factors, was Ϫ.29. The linear contrast of CSI was significant, reflecting a gradual decline of intrusion costs with increasing CSI, F(1, 117) ϭ 71.59, p 2 ϭ .38. This decline did not interact with WMC (F Ͻ 1). Intrusion costs increased with larger relevantset size, F(1, 117) ϭ 95.12, p 2 ϭ .45, and this effect interacted with the linear contrast of CSI, F(1, 117) ϭ 11.74, p 2 ϭ .08. The relevant-set size effects on intrusion costs became more pronounced for longer CSIs.
Accuracy. Substantial intrusion costs were also observed in the error data as shown by Figure 4 . Intrusion costs were calculated as the difference between the proportion of errors to intrusion probes and to new probes. They were analyzed by conducting an ANCOVA with CSI and relevant-set size as factors and WMC as the covariate. The covariate was significant, F(1, 117) ϭ 10.63, p 2 ϭ .08, p ϭ .001; the correlation between WMC and intrusion costs was Ϫ.29. Intrusion costs declined linearly with CSI, F(1, 117) ϭ 17.66, p 2 ϭ .13, and they were larger with a relevant-set size of three (.15) than with a relevant-set size of one (.07), F(1, 117) ϭ 78.68, p 2 ϭ .40. Neither of these effects interacted with WMC (all Fs Ͻ 1). 
Discussion
The pattern of differences between young adults with high and with low WMC mirrors the pattern of differences between young and old adults observed previously with the same experimental design (Oberauer, 2001) . As with age in the previous study, capacity had no effect on how efficiently people diminished the irrelevant-set size effect over increasing CSIs. Both old age and low WMC, on the other hand, were associated with higher intrusion costs.
About 1 s after the cue indicating which list was relevant, the size of the irrelevant list had no noticeable effect on the RTs to probes. With the exception of the largest CSI, it also had no effect on the error rate. This suggests that it takes about 1 s to remove the irrelevant set from the capacity-limited part of working memory. Young adults with high and with low WMC were equally efficient in this regard. This mirrors the previous finding of no age differences in the reduction of irrelevant-set size effects over CSI. Apparently there are neither age differences nor WMC differences in the efficiency of removing irrelevant information from the central part of working memory. Confidence in this conclusion, however, was compromised by the low reliability of the effect and by the present reanalysis of age effects in which the age difference became significant. Experiment 2 provides a further look at this issue.
The intrusion costs, which remained substantial up to 5 s after the cue (and potentially longer), provide strong evidence that the irrelevant list had not been removed completely from memory at that time. Although no longer held in the capacity-limited part of working memory, the elements of the irrelevant list are presumably still activated in LTM. This activation generates a misleading familiarity signal for an intrusion probe, which must be overcome by explicit recollection of the contents of either the relevant list (to notice that the probe was not among them) or the irrelevant list (to decide that the probe was in the wrong list and therefore must be rejected). Individual or group differences in intrusion costs can reflect either differences in the strength of inhibition exerted to prevent the misleading familiarity signal, or differences in the efficiency of recollection processes that override it, or both. The present data cannot separate these two possible sources of intrusion costs. This is the main purpose of Experiment 2, as explained below.
There was one remarkable difference between the age contrast and the capacity contrast in Experiment 1. Older adults had an overall accuracy level slightly higher than the young adults in the present study (94% vs. 92%), and Figure 4 shows that their intrusion costs in terms of errors were comparable to the present high-WMC group. On the other hand, old adults' intrusion costs in RTs were substantially larger than those of even the low-WMC group. Thus, it seems that whereas young adults with low WMC show increased intrusion costs in both speed and accuracy, old adults show them exclusively in speed. This suggests a more conservative speed-accuracy trade-off criterion on the side of the old adults.
Different speed-accuracy trade-offs can pose a problem for group comparisons, as would have been the case if I had used an undifferentiated group of young adults that, compared to the old group, had shorter RTs but higher error rates. In that case, the relative slowing of old adults could be interpreted as just a result of their more conservative speed-accuracy criterion. In the present case, however, the old group can be compared to the young group with high WMC, which has equivalent accuracy, and this comparison shows the disproportional slowing of old adults on intrusion probes even more pronounced than the comparison to the whole young group. In this way, the differentiation of young adults according to their WMC helps to disentangle two effects of old age on processing speed-the genuine cognitive deficit, which is particularly pronounced on intrusion probes, and a general tendency to trade time for accuracy. I will return to the issue of agedifferential speed-accuracy trade-off in the context of Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
In this experiment, I tested young adults with high and low WMC as well as old adults on three conflict recognition para- digms. One of them was again the modified Sternberg task. The second was the local recognition task first introduced by Oberauer (2003) . This task is similar to the modified Sternberg task in that it requires recollection based on content-context bindings. Participants saw several words to be memorized, each in a different frame on the screen. A series of probes then appeared, one in each frame, and participants had to judge each probe as to whether it matched the word that was previously seen in that frame. Probes from the memory list presented in the correct frames (positive probes) and those presented in other frames (intrusion probes) were equal in familiarity and could be distinguished only by their bindings. In contrast to the modified Sternberg task, however, no part of the list was ever declared as irrelevant. Each element in the list could occur as an intrusion probe as well as a positive probe, so there was nothing to be gained from inhibiting their activation. Therefore, individual differences in intrusion costs in the local recognition task can be more unambiguously attributed to the efficiency of recollection on the basis of bindings between the words and their spatial contexts. If age differences in the modified Sternberg task are due to an age-related deficit in inhibitory power, then age differences should be smaller in the local recognition task than in the modified Sternberg task. The same holds for individual differences in WMC.
The local recognition task was paired with a global recognition task that shared most of its procedural details, with the exception that each probe was compared to the whole list. Thus, no bindings between content and spatial context were required-the task was similar to the standard Sternberg (1969) task-so that global recognition could serve as a baseline for assessing the role of bindings in short-term recognition. The logic behind the pairing of local and global recognition is similar to that of exclusion and inclusion conditions in the process-dissociation procedure of Jacoby (1991): Local recognition uses an exclusion instruction, whereas global recognition uses an inclusion instruction.
The third conflict paradigm was an n-back task. In this task, participants read a sequence of words, one by one, and judged each word as to whether it matched the word n steps back in the sequence. The step size n varied between 1 and 3. The n-back task has been used extensively in neuroimaging studies of working memory, and there is evidence that it relies extensively on dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, in particular with n Ͼ 1 (e.g., E. E. Smith & Jonides, 1997) . With n ϭ 1, the task can be solved by reliance on familiarity alone: The last element encountered is most likely the most active, so that a criterion could be set for familiarity values of each new word such that the word is accepted only if it matches the one immediately preceding it. This could be the reason why responses in 1-back tasks are exceptionally fast and accurate (McElree, 2001 ). When n exceeds 1, recollection is needed to decide whether the current word matches the one exactly n steps back, as opposed to n ϩ 1 or n -1. Conflict will arise, in particular, when a word matches a previous one more recent than the required step size. Therefore, I define intrusion probes in the n-back task as words matching previous words with a lag less than n. Gray, Chabris, and Braver (2003) recently showed in a functional magnetic resonance imaging study that the activation measured in prefrontal cortex on these trials was positively correlated with an individual's score on a test of fluid intelligence, and the proportion of intrusion errors was negatively correlated with the intelligence test score. Other studies have shown that old adults have difficulties with the n-back task (e.g., Kirchner, 1958 ; but see Hartley et al., 2001 , Experiment 1, for a case of age equivalence). As far as I know, however, this task has never been related to individual differences in WMC. Therefore, it is unknown to what extent it reflects the same sources of variance as standard WMC tasks.
Unfortunately, performance in the n-back task can be attributed to several sources of variance that cannot be easily disentangled. One component to good performance (in versions with n Ͼ 1) is certainly the ability to establish and maintain bindings between the contents (e.g., words) and their temporal context. A second component could be efficient inhibition of all contents that lie farther back than the required n. A third component could be the ability to update the content-context bindings with every new stimulus. With each new element in the series, n previous elements bound to temporal positions relative to the present must be shifted one step back. This shows that the n-back task is more difficult to analyze than the other two conflict tasks investigated here. I included it in the study nonetheless because, given its extensive use in the cognitive neuroscience of working memory, I think there is a need to provide evidence about its construct validity as an operationalization of working memory.
Method Participants
Participants were 120 young adults (42 men and 78 women, mean age ϭ 17.8 years, SD ϭ 0.77), none of whom took part in Experiment 1, and 30 old adults (13 men and 17 women, mean age ϭ 71.8 years, SD ϭ 3.69), 1 of whom had already participated 3 years before in the old group included in Experiment 1. As is usual in age-comparative studies, the young participants outperformed the old participants on a standardized test of mental speed, the German version of the Digit Symbol test (Wechsler, 1964) , t(148) ϭ 5.2, p 2 ϭ .16, whereas the old adults showed better performance on a vocabulary test, the Mehrfachwahl-Wortschatz Test (Version A; Lehrl, Merz, Burckhard, & Fischer, 1991) , t(148) ϭ Ϫ5.95, p 2 ϭ .19. Old adults had, on average, 10 years of formal education (SD ϭ 1.7), and young adults, 11.2 years (SD ϭ 0.72), a significant difference, t(148) ϭ 5.4, p 2 ϭ .16. The age groups did not differ in self-rated physical health, which both groups rated as good to average. One young participant's data from the n-back task had to be excluded because she or he apparently misunderstood the instructions.
Materials and Procedure
All participants were tested on the same four standard WMC measures that were used in Experiment 1 in one session. In a second session, they worked on the modified Sternberg task and the n-back task. The third session comprised the local and the global recognition task.
Modified Sternberg task. This task was a shortened version of the paradigm used in Experiment 1. Only CSIs of 100 ms and 1 s were used. Each participant started with two blocks of practice trials, one for each CSI level, comprising 12 trials each. After that, they went through four blocks of 32 test trials each, with CSI ϭ 100 ms, 1 s, 1 s, and 100 ms, in this order for all participants. The procedure differed from that of Experiment 1 in that participants could choose at the beginning of the first practice block their preferred assignment of yes and no to the two arrow keys (this was also true for the other recognition tasks in Experiment 2). In all other respects, the method was exactly as in Experiment 1.
Local and global recognition. Each trial of these two tasks began with the sequential presentation of a list of words. The words were taken from the same pool of short nouns that was used for the modified Sternberg task in both experiments. Each word was presented in one of several rectangular frames arranged in a row on the computer screen. The list length, and thereby the number of frames in the row, varied from two to five. Each word was presented for 900 ms, followed by a 100-ms interstimulus interval. The words were presented in random order, so that the temporal order did not correspond to the left-right order of the frames. Following a 500-ms interval after the last list element disappeared, the first of a series of probe words was presented. Whereas memory list words were presented in white on a black background, probe words were displayed in red. In the local recognition task, each probe appeared in one of the frames, and participants were instructed to accept the probe if and only if it matched the memory list word presented in that frame. In the global recognition task, probes appeared below the row of frames, centrally on the screen, and participants were instructed to accept a word if it had been presented as part of the memory list, regardless of its spatial location. Each probe was displayed until the participant responded, after which the next probe appeared following a 200-ms response-stimulus interval. The number of probes in each trial was equal to the list length, and in the local recognition task there was one probe in each frame, in a random order. Participants were instructed to work as fast and accurately as possible, and accuracy feedback was given after each trial by a statement of the form "X out of Y correct."
All participants started with the global recognition task, followed by the local recognition task. For both tasks, participants worked through one practice block with 8 trials, followed by four test blocks with 40 trials each. Each block contained an equal number of trials with each of the four list lengths (ranging from two to five) in a pseudorandom order. The memory lists and probe lists for each trial were prepared by a computer program that selected words and probe types at random with the constraint that, across all trials, there were 50% positive probes (to be accepted) and 50% probes to be rejected, which in the case of the local recognition task were equally divided among new probes (i.e., not presented as part of a memory list in the whole block) and intrusion probes (i.e., words from the current memory list, but presented in a different frame). The probe words within each trial were all different words, so that a positive probe could not occur as an intrusion probe earlier or later in the same trial. In the case of global recognition, all to-be-rejected probes were new words. The program also ensured that across all trials of the same list length, the positive probes were distributed equally (within a margin of plus or minus one) across the serial positions, defined by the temporal order of presentation.
The n-back task. Each trial of the n-back task consisted of a list of 30 words selected from the same pool as was used in the other tasks. The words were presented one by one, each in one of three rectangular frames arranged in a row on the screen. The frame for each word was selected at random with the constraint that no two words following each other were presented in the same frame. The change of spatial location from each word to the next was used to prevent perceptual matching of successive words. Each word was displayed until the participant responded by pressing one of the arrow keys; 200 ms later the next word appeared in a new frame. Participants were instructed to accept a word if and only if it matched the word presented n steps back in the list. The step size n was constantly displayed as a red digit centered in the lower half of the screen. This digit was flanked by two arrows, the one on the left pointing left and the one on the right pointing right, each accompanied by the response (yes or no) the participant had assigned to it at the beginning of the task. Following each trial, participants saw a feedback screen with statements of the form "X out of Y correct," separate for positive (to-be-accepted) and negative (to-berejected) words.
Participants first worked through three practice blocks, one for each step size n (1-3) in ascending order. Each practice block consisted of three trials with 30 words each. This was followed by six test blocks, repeating the sequence of n ϭ 2, 3, 1 twice. Each test block consisted of six trials. Each trial was generated by the computer program that displayed the task by selecting words at random from the pool. With a probability of .25, each successive word matched the one n steps back and thereby was a positive word. There had to be at least 6 out of 30 positive words in a generated trial for it to be used. In blocks with n Ͼ 1, there was a probability of .25 that a word matched a previous word fewer than n steps back. These were the intrusion words, because they were expected to generate conflict between familiarity and recollection. All other words were new words that had never before been used in the entire block. As an additional constraint, the program avoided series of repetitions of the same word with lag n (e.g., tree, car, tree, dog, tree, . . . in a trial with n ϭ 2).
Results
The z scores obtained from the four WMC tasks were averaged to form a composite score. When the sample of young adults was split at the median into two groups of high versus low WMC, the high-WMC group had a mean composite z score of 0.69 (SD ϭ .36), the low-WMC group had a mean of Ϫ0.35 (SD ϭ .37), and the old group obtained a mean of Ϫ0.70 (SD ϭ .76). Thus, the group of old adults had, on average, lower WMC than even the low-WMC group of young adults. This difference was significant, t(88) ϭ 2.98, p ϭ .004, p 2 ϭ .09. RTs from the recognition tasks were trimmed as in Experiment 1. This affected 1.43% of the data in the modified Sternberg task, 1.76% in the local recognition task, and 1.81% in the n-back task. I first present analyses of variance (ANOVAs) and ANCOVAs for individual recognition tasks, followed by structural equation models that were used to investigate the association between WMC and recognition tasks on a higher level of aggregation; in the final section I present results from applying the diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978) to the recognition data.
Each recognition task was analyzed by ANOVAs including age as a between-subjects factor, focusing on the age contrast, and by parallel ANCOVAs restricted to the young sample using WMC as the covariate, thereby focusing on the capacity contrast. The first set of these analyses concerns intrusion costs, and the second set concerns set-size effects. To keep the presentation concise, I report only effects of theoretical interest.
Intrusion Costs
Figures 5 and 6 summarize the age and capacity contrasts on intrusion effects for RTs and for errors, respectively. The data for the modified Sternberg task are displayed in the top panels, those for the local recognition paradigm in the middle panels, and those for the n-back task in the bottom panels. The three tasks displayed a similar pattern of results: Whereas old adults showed an increase of RTs on intrusion probes relative to negative probes that was larger on a proportional scale than the corresponding increase in young adults, their error level on all three probe types was well within the range of the young participants. The converse was true for the contrast between high-and low-WMC individuals. Their RTs did not differ at all, but the group with lower WMC made more errors overall, and in particular on the intrusion trials, thus leading to an increase of intrusion costs with lower WMC in two of the three tasks (modified Sternberg and local recognition). For statistical analysis of these effects, I calculated intrusion costs from log-transformed RTs and from errors as the difference between intrusion probes and new probes.
Modified Sternberg task. The intrusion costs were submitted to ANOVAs with relevant-set size, CSI, and age as factors. Intru-sion costs in RT were disproportionately larger in old than in young adults, as evidenced by the main effect of age, F(1, 148) ϭ 22.99, p 2 ϭ .13. This replicates one of the main results of Oberauer (2001). Intrusion costs on RTs also increased with relevantset size, F(1, 148) ϭ 27.91, p 2 ϭ .16, but this was the case only at the longer CSI, F(1, 148) ϭ 49.77, p 2 ϭ .25, for the interaction. This replicates a similar interaction between relevant-set size and CSI in Experiment 1. The parallel ANOVA on errors revealed no effect of age (F Ͻ 1); the main effect of relevant-set size and its interaction with CSI were significant and went in the same direction as observed for RT. Analogous ANCOVAs were performed with WMC as covariate. The covariate was not significant in the analysis of RTs (F Ͻ 1), but it was significant in the analysis of errors, F(1, 118) F(1, 148) ϭ 468.50, p 2 ϭ .76, but no effect of age, F(1, 148) ϭ 1.84, and no interaction (F Ͻ 1). The analogous ANCOVA using WMC as the covariate showed no effect of WMC on the RT intrusion costs (F Ͻ 1), but intrusion costs in errors increased as WMC decreased, F(1, 118) ϭ 20.45, p 2 ϭ .15. As in the modified Sternberg task, old adults showed Figure 5 . Reaction times as a function of probe type for young adults with high and with low working memory capacity (WMC) and for old adults in Experiment 2. Error bars reflect 2 standard errors. Data are plotted on a logarithmic scale, corresponding to the log-transformation of reaction times for the analyses. increased intrusion costs only in RTs, whereas low-WMC young adults showed them exclusively in errors. The n-back task. Intrusion costs on RTs were analyzed by performing an ANOVA with step size (n ϭ 2 vs. 3) and age as factors. There was again a main effect of age, although relatively weak in size compared with the other two tasks, F(1, 147) ϭ 5.31, p 2 ϭ .04, p ϭ .023. For old adults, but not for young adults, the intrusion costs were smaller for n ϭ 3 than for n ϭ 2, as indicated by a main effect of step size, F(1, 147) ϭ 7.04, p 2 ϭ .05, p ϭ .009, and its interaction with age, F(1, 147) ϭ 8.47, p 2 ϭ .05, p ϭ .004. A parallel analysis of error intrusion costs yielded only a main effect of step size, F(1, 147) ϭ 48.89, p 2 ϭ .25, again reflecting a decline of intrusion costs when step size increased from 2 to 3; the main effect of age and its interaction with step size were not significant (Fs Ͻ 1). The ANCOVAs on the data of young adults, using WMC as the covariate, showed no significant effect in the analysis of RT intrusion costs (all Fs Ͻ 1), and only the main effect of step size already mentioned above in the analysis of error intrusion costs (all other Fs Ͻ 1). Thus, there was no evidence that intrusion costs in the n-back task were related to WMC. A separate ANCOVA on the error rate of the positive probes, however, confirmed the impression from Figure 6 that WMC was related to the proportion of misses of positive probes, F(1, 117) ϭ 8.90, p 2 ϭ .07, p ϭ .003. Table 2 summarizes the proportional increases of RTs over set size. For the modified Sternberg task, this was the size of the relevant set. For all tasks, I computed the percentage of increase from the smallest to the largest set size (i.e., from two to five in the case of local and global recognition, and from one to three in the case of modified Sternberg and n-back); mean RTs of all set sizes can be found in Appendix B. The individual and age differences in set-size effects stand in sharp contrast to those for intrusion effects: In the age contrast as well as in the WMC contrast, the group with lower WMC showed proportionally equal or even smaller set-size effects than the group with higher WMC. The only exception to this pattern was the proportional set-size effect of old adults on the local recognition task, which was larger than that of young adults. The effect was weak, however, and the corresponding interaction of age with the linear contrast of set size on log-transformed RTs just failed the criterion of significance, F(1, 148) ϭ 2.98, p 2 ϭ .02, p ϭ .086. These results show that not all differences between conditions in the recognition tasks tend to be disproportionately inflated in old age. Set-size effects seem to behave largely as expected from proportional slowing. This strengthens the interpretation that the disproportional intrusion costs of old adults reflect a specific effect that cannot be explained by a general slowing factor: Any form of general slowing should inflate set-size effects in the same way as intrusion costs. See Figure 2 for the corresponding comparison of relevant-set size effects and intrusion effects in Experiment 1.
Set-Size Effects
The modified Sternberg task also included a manipulation of the set size of the irrelevant list. This provides an opportunity to replicate the decline of irrelevant-set size effects over increasing CSI and to test again whether it was independent of age and WMC. I analyzed log-transformed RTs with an ANOVA using CSI, irrelevant-set size, and age as factors. As in Experiment 1, the irrelevant-set size effect on RTs was significant, F(1, 148) ϭ 28.42, p 2 ϭ .16, and it declined from the short to the long CSI, F(1, 148) ϭ 9.26, p 2 ϭ .06, p ϭ .003. This interaction of irrelevant-set size and CSI was not modified by age (F Ͻ 1). For the young group, the irrelevant-set size effect declined from 56 ms (SD ϭ 92) at the short CSI (0.1 s) to 16 ms (SD ϭ 75) at the long CSI (1 s). For the old group, it declined from 70 ms (SD ϭ 75) to 37 ms (SD ϭ 84). Even at the long CSI, it was significantly larger than zero in both groups, t(119) ϭ 2.27, p ϭ .01, for the young, and t(29) ϭ 2.39, p ϭ .02, for the old group, but the two effects did not differ from each other, t(148) ϭ Ϫ1.34, p ϭ .18. A parallel analysis on errors yielded a significant main effect of the irrelevant-set size, F(1, 148) ϭ 15.54, p 2 ϭ .09, but its interactions with age and with CSI, as well as the triple interaction, were nonsignificant (all Fs Ͻ 1.3).
An analogous ANCOVA was conducted on the RTs from the young sample, with irrelevant-set size and CSI as factors and WMC as the covariate. This analysis showed that the covariate did not interact with the main effect of irrelevant-set size nor with the interaction of irrelevant-set size and CSI (both Fs Ͻ 1). The parallel ANCOVA with errors also yielded only a marginal threeway interaction of these variables, F(1, 118) ϭ 3.58, p 2 ϭ .03, p ϭ .06. When tested separately, the high-WMC group showed a significant decline of the irrelevant-set size effect from the short CSI (3 percentage points) to the long one (where it disappeared completely), F(1, 59) ϭ 6.85, p 2 ϭ .10, p ϭ .011. For the low-WMC group, the irrelevant-set size effect remained constant at 3 percentage points for both CSIs, and the decline was not significant (F Ͻ 1). Therefore, a capacity-related difference in the efficiency of removing the irrelevant-set size from the central part Note. Entries are percentages of increase from the shortest to the longest set size. WMC ϭ working memory capacity.
of working memory cannot be ruled out. Again, the reliability of the decline of irrelevant-set size over CSI was poor (Cronbach's alpha was .32 for RT and .15 for accuracy). In conclusion, there was again evidence that participants can remove the irrelevant list from the capacity-limited part of working memory quickly, but this removal was not yet complete 1 s after the cue. One reason for this could be that participants in this experiment received less practice overall with the modified Sternberg task (two blocks, as opposed to six blocks in the previous experiments). Age differences and WMC differences in this regard were again small or nonexistent, but the conclusiveness of this finding is again limited by the low reliability of the effect.
Structural Equation Models of WMC and Short-Term Recognition Tasks
The next set of analyses addressed the question of how variance in performance parameters derived from short-term recognition tasks relates to standard WMC measures. I tested structural equation models on the variance-covariance matrices of the young adults; all models were computed with AMOS, Version 5 (Arbuckle, 2003) . Each model defines a latent factor reflecting WMC and relates it to one or two latent factors from the recognition tasks. From the recognition tasks, I used the accuracy data because the previous analyses showed that accuracy, not speed, was associated with WMC in the young sample. I computed dЈ values (i.e., the sensitivity parameter from signal-detection theory; cf. Macmillan & Creelman, 1991) to capture participants' ability to discriminate positive probes from to-be-rejected probes. The dЈ parameter can be computed as the difference between the probability of hits and the probability of false alarms after these probabilities have been transformed to their corresponding z scores in a standard normal distribution (also known as probit transformation). 4 For all tasks, I computed dЈ(n) from the hit rate and the false-alarm rate on new probes. For the conflict recognition tasks, a second parameter called dЈ(i) could be computed by using false alarms on intrusion probes instead of new probes. The dЈ(i) parameters are of particular interest because they reflect a relatively pure measure of the contribution of recollection to the recognition judgment, because positive and intrusion probes cannot be discriminated on the basis of familiarity. The correlation matrix of the variables as well as their reliabilities are given in Table 3 .
The first model exploits the contrast of local and global recognition, using dЈ(i) from the former and dЈ(n) from the latter. These two tasks are equivalent in all procedural details, with the critical difference that the discrimination of positive from new probes in global recognition can make use of both familiarity and recollection information, whereas the discrimination of positive and intrusion probes in local recognition must rely exclusively on recollection, because they do not differ in familiarity. Therefore, I defined a recollection factor that contributes variance to the dЈ measures from both tasks, and I defined an additional familiarity factor that contributes variance only to the dЈ(n) from global recognition. The model, Model 1a, is shown by the solid lines in Figure 7 with its standardized parameter estimates. Note. Correlations below the diagonal are for young adults (N ϭ 119; correlations greater than .19 are significant with p Ͻ .05), and correlations above the diagonal are for older adults (N ϭ 30; correlations greater than .37 are significant with p Ͻ .05). Correlations in parentheses are not stochastically independent (i.e., they are based on the same hit rate). Entries on the diagonal (in bold) are Cronbach's alphas based on the young sample, using scores from between 11 and 15 items for the standard WMC tasks, dЈ values from four set sizes for local and global recognition, dЈ values for short and long cue-stimulus intervals for the modified Sternberg task, and dЈ from step sizes of 2 and 3 in the case of the n-back task. RSpan ϭ reading span; MU ϭ memory updating; MU-n ϭ numerical version of MU; MU-s ϭ spatial version of MU; SSTM ϭ spatial short-term memory task (scores for all WMC tasks are z scores); MS ϭ modified Sternberg task; LOC ϭ local recognition; NB ϭ n-back task; GLO ϭ global recognition; (i) ϭ a dЈ measure based on intrusion false alarms; (n) ϭ a dЈ measure based on new-probe false alarms. a Mean is significantly ( p Ͻ .05) larger than that of the other age group.
Model 1a serves to test two assumptions. The first is the assumption from dual-process theories of recognition (Atkinson et al., 1974; Yonelinas, 2002 ) that two processes, constituting two sources of variance, contribute to performance in recognition tasks. If this is true, two distinct factors, one reflecting familiarity and one recollection, should provide a better account for the covariances among the dЈ variables than a single recognition factor. The second assumption is that variance in WMC reflects variance in the ability to maintain temporary bindings. WMC should then be correlated with the recollection factor but not the familiarity factor. Model 1a provides a particularly strong test of these hypotheses because the contrast of global and local recognition constitutes an experimental manipulation in which the covariances of the recognition variables with each other and with the WMC variables serve as dependent variables.
Model 1a had a satisfactory fit, 2 (47, N ϭ 119) ϭ 70.6, comparative fit index (CFI) ϭ .947, root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) ϭ .065 (90% confidence bands ϭ .03 and .10), standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR) ϭ .0689.
5 Both factors were well defined, as indicated by the substantial loadings of the variables assigned to them. Leaving out the familiarity factor from the model leads to a dramatic decrease in fit, ⌬ 2 (5) ϭ 72.8. This provides strong evidence for the separability of familiarity and recollection as two sources of variance contributing to recognition decisions in the global recognition task. The relative loadings of the global recognition variables on the two factors suggest that familiarity contributes about two thirds of the systematic variance in this task, and recollection contributes about one third. WMC was significantly correlated with the recollection factor, but not with the familiarity factor. The small negative correlation was not significant as indicated by the negligible loss of fit when it was removed from the model, ⌬ 2 (1) ϭ 1.5. One might suspect that the familiarity factor is at a disadvantage in correlating with a third variable because it captures only the specific variance of the dЈ(n) variables, whereas the recollection factor monopolizes the shared variance of all dЈ variables. To demonstrate that this is not the case, I tested a second model that reversed the roles of the two recognition factors: All dЈ variables loaded on a general factor, and the dЈ(i) variables also loaded on a specific factor. In this model, the general factor represents a mix of familiarity and recollection, and the specific factor represents the additional contribution of recollection to the local recognition task. In this model, the specific factor was correlated significantly with the WMC factor (r ϭ .49), whereas the general factor was not (r ϭ .10). This demonstrates that it is not the formal structure (general vs. specific factor) but the content that determines a factor's correlation with WMC in this model.
In an extension of Model 1a, I added a latent factor defined by the loadings from the dЈ(i) variables of the modified Sternberg task. The recollection, familiarity, and WMC factors were used as predictors of the modified Sternberg factor. The extension is shown by the dashed lines in Figure 7 . The extended model, Model 1b, had a good fit, 2 (67, N ϭ 119) ϭ 91.7, CFI ϭ .953, RMSEA ϭ .056 (90% confidence bands ϭ .02 and .08), SRMR ϭ .066. If the modified Sternberg task reflects variance due to the efficient inhibition of the irrelevant list, and this variance is shared with WMC, then WMC should be a predictor of the modified Sternberg dЈ(i) factor over and above the recollection factor obtained from local recognition (which does not reflect inhibition). This was not the case: Whereas the recollection factor obtained a significant path parameter (.48), the WMC (.18) and the familiarity factor (.14) did not.
The remaining two models, shown in Figures 8 and 9 , were used to investigate the common variance of several recognition paradigms and its relationship to WMC. Model 2 (see Figure 8 ) extracts the common variance of the dЈ(i) measures from the three conflict recognition paradigms, reflecting the ability to discrimi-5 Following the recommendations of Hu and Bentler (1999) , I used a combination of the CFI and SRMR to evaluate models. A CFI greater than .95 and an SRMR less than .08 are regarded as indicators of a good fit. Another often recommended measure of fit, the RMSEA, is also reported. Raykov and Widaman (1995) regarded a value of less than .05 for the RMSEA as indicating a good fit. Because the purpose of the structural equation models here was not to search for the best fitting model but to investigate the relationships between familiarity, recollection, and WMC, I did not try to optimize the fit by adding further parameters. for global recognition (Glob), for the four list lengths (ranging from 2 to 5), as well as dЈ(intrusion) from the modified Sternberg (MS) task for two cue-stimulus interval levels (0.1 and 1 s). RSpan ϭ reading span; SSTM ϭ spatial short-term memory task; MU ϭ memory updating; num ϭ numerical version of MU; spat ϭ spatial version of MU; WMC ϭ working memory capacity; e ϭ error term. nate positive and intrusion probes on the basis of recollection. This model had an excellent fit, 2 (12, N ϭ 119) ϭ 5.9, CFI ϭ 1.0, RMSEA ϭ 0 (90% confidence bands ϭ 0 and .033), SRMR ϭ .03. The correlation between WMC and the dЈ(i) factor was substantial. Constraining it to zero led to a sizable decrease in fit, ⌬ 2 (1) ϭ 19.8. Constraining it to one, however, yielded an about equal decrease in fit, ⌬ 2 (1) ϭ 21.2. Thus, the ability to discriminate positive from intrusion probes in conflict recognition tasks is correlated with WMC, but not identical with it.
Model 3 (see Figure 9 ) extracts the common variance of the dЈ(n) measures, which reflect a mixture of familiarity and recollection. This model includes the global recognition task, for which dЈ(n) could also be computed. Model 3 had a good fit, 2 (18, N ϭ 119) ϭ 27.9, CFI ϭ .942, RMSEA ϭ .068 (90% confidence bands ϭ 0 and .115), SRMR ϭ .064. The correlation of WMC with the dЈ(n) factor was considerably lower than that with the dЈ(i) factor in the previous model. The standard errors for these two correlations were .11 and .12, respectively, which implies that their difference amounts to 2 standard error units, sufficient to be regarded as significant. Constraining the correlation between WMC and dЈ(n) to zero led to a significant but relatively small loss of fit, ⌬ 2 (1) ϭ 6.9. In conclusion, the ability to discriminate positive from new probes in the four recognition paradigms used here was correlated with WMC, but the correlation was not particularly strong.
Modeling RT Distributions With the Diffusion Model
I analyzed RT distributions of the three conflict recognition tasks by fitting the diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & Tuerlinckx, 2002) to them. The purpose of this endeavor was to obtain more direct evidence on the speed-accuracy trade-off criteria of young and old adults. The diffusion model assumes that the decision process is driven by the gradual and noisy accumulation of evidence for or against accepting a given probe until one of two decision boundaries is met. A positive response is given after meeting the upper boundary, and a negative response is given after meeting the lower boundary. An error occurs when the drift ends at the wrong boundary because of noise. The model in its current form has seven parameters: the drift rate, v, which reflects the average amount of evidence per time; the starting point of the drift process, z, which lies between the two boundaries and can be Figure 8 . Structural Equation Model 2, using dЈ(intrusion) from the conflict recognition tasks in Experiment 2. RSpan ϭ reading span; SSTM ϭ spatial short-term memory task; MU ϭ memory updating; num ϭ numerical version of MU; spat ϭ spatial version of MU; WMC ϭ working memory capacity; recoll ϭ recollection; MS ϭ modified Sternberg task; Loc ϭ local recognition; NB ϭ n-back task; e ϭ error term. Figure 9 . Structural Equation Model 3, using dЈ(new) from the four recognition tasks in Experiment 2. RSpan ϭ reading span; SSTM ϭ spatial short-term memory task; MU ϭ memory updating; num ϭ numerical version of MU; spat ϭ spatial version of MU; WMC ϭ working memory capacity; fam ϩ rec ϭ familiarity and recollection; MS ϭ modified Sternberg task; Loc ϭ local recognition; NB ϭ n-back task; Glob ϭ global recognition; e ϭ error term. biased toward one of them; the distance between the two boundaries, a; the trial-to-trial variability of the drift rate, ; the variability of the starting point, sz; the nondecision component, Ter (reflecting mostly sensory and motor processes); and the variability in Ter, called st. The theoretically most important parameters are v and a. The drift rate, v, reflects the efficiency of information processing in the decision phase and thereby should capture effects of task difficulty as well as a person's ability. The distance between the decision boundaries, a, reflects a person's speedaccuracy trade-off criterion, which is more conservative when the boundaries are further apart and, hence, further from the starting point. With boundaries close to the starting point, the drift process reaches them earlier, on average, but is more likely to hit the wrong one due to noise. The diffusion model applies to the full set of behavioral data: means and distributions of RTs for correct and for error responses as well as the proportion of errors (Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998) . The model was originally developed for short-term recognition (Ratcliff, 1978) and has been successfully applied to age differences in recognition tasks before (Ratcliff, Thapar, & McKoon, 2004) .
In a first step, I constructed group distributions for the three groups (low WMC, high WMC, and old adults) by Vincentizing RTs from the three conflict recognition tasks. Vincentizing is a procedure to aggregate distributions that minimizes distortion of their shape (Ratcliff, 1979) . Outliers, defined as before, were excluded; RTs of errors were aggregated in separate distributions. One pair of distributions was generated for each probe type (positive, negative, and intrusion), collapsing over other factors varied in the task (e.g., set size). Differences in task difficulty due to these factors should be absorbed in the parameter of the diffusion model, which reflects variability of drift rate from trial to trial. I fit the closed-form solution of the diffusion model developed by Ratcliff and Tuerlinckx (2002) , using the Matlab function for the cumulative distribution provided by Tuerlinckx (2004) . The model was fit to the data with the chi-square method developed by Ratcliff and Tuerlinckx, using the simplex algorithm implemented in Matlab (Version 6.1). Data from the three probe types of each task were fit simultaneously, thereby constraining most of the parameters to be the same across probe types. Differences were allowed in drift rate, because the decisions on different probe types are likely to differ in difficulty. Moreover, the starting point, z, was allowed to be different on intrusion probes than on the other two probe types. This was done as an approximation to the assumption that familiarity and recollection work in opposition on these trials, with the relatively fast familiarity assessment leading the drift process in the wrong direction early in the process. The diffusion model does not allow specifying two opposing sources of evidence that act on the drift rate differently at different points in time. Therefore, I used the starting point to capture the effect of an early familiarity signal: If familiarity pushes the balance of evidence toward a yes response early in the processing of intrusion probes, the model can approximate this through a z parameter biased toward the upper decision boundary. Table 4 presents the parameter estimates obtained for the three groups on the three tasks together with the resulting chi-square values.
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In a second step, I fit the RT distributions of individual participants on the local recognition task. Individual fits were not possible for the other two tasks because there were not enough data 6 The chi-square values indicate a significant degree of misfit; at the same time, it is obvious from Table 4 that chi-square largely depends on the number of RTs entering each distribution, N. The problem that chi-square is overly sensitive with high N has been long recognized in structural equation modeling research, where alternative fit indices that are independent of N have been developed (Hu & Bentler, 1999) . No such fit indices are available yet for mathematical models of RT distributions so that model fits cannot be evaluated by established standards. Note. N represents the number of reaction times forming the distributions (summed over three probe types); for individual fits, averages of chi-square and N across individuals are given; there are 23 degrees of freedom for the chi-square tests (11 data points ϫ 3 conditions Ϫ 10 parameters). ϭ drift rate (pos ϭ positive probes, neg ϭ negative probes, int ϭ intrusion probes); a ϭ separation of decision boundaries; z ϭ starting point of drift; ϭ variability of drift; Ter ϭ nondecisional component; sz ϭ variability of starting point; st ϭ variability of Ter; WMC ϭ working memory capacity. Significant ( p Ͻ .05) differences between old and young adults are indicated by use of boldface; a significant ( p Ͻ .05) correlation of a parameter with WMC in the young group is indicated by use of italics.
points for all probe types. The bottom three lines of Table 4 contain the average parameter estimates from the individual fits. Because the individual fits yielded parameter estimates for each participant, group differences could be tested for significance. I computed pairwise t tests comparing parameter estimates of young and old adults, and correlations of parameter estimates with WMC in the young group, the results of which are also summarized in Table 4 . Several observations are noteworthy. First, there were large and consistent differences in drift rates for the three probe types. Drift rates were largest for negative probes, intermediate for positive probes, and lowest for intrusion probes. This can be interpreted within the dual-process framework as applied to the specific demands of conflict recognition tasks: Whereas a lack of familiarity of negative probes is unambiguous evidence for rejecting these probes, familiarity of positive probes is ambiguous evidence because the same degree of familiarity would be expected from an intrusion probe. The cognitive system apparently adapts to this situation by weighing lack of familiarity as strong evidence, resulting in a high drift rate on negative probes, but weighing the presence of familiarity as relatively weak evidence, resulting in a lower drift rate on positive probes. The drift rate of intrusion probes is still smaller than that of positive probes because familiarity and recollection provide conflicting evidence on intrusion probes and therefore push the drift in opposite directions.
Second, the decision criterion parameter, a, was larger in old than in young adults. This confirms the assumption that old adults work with a more conservative speed-accuracy trade-off setting. Apart from age differences in a (and corresponding differences in the z parameters), old adults differed from young adults in the nondecision component, Ter, and its variance, st, but not in drift rates. The same pattern has been observed repeatedly by Ratcliff and his colleagues (e.g., Ratcliff, Thapar, & McKoon, 2001; Ratcliff et al., 2004) . There was a tendency, however, for old adults to have smaller drift rates on intrusion probes relative to their drift rates on negative probes. An analysis of this pattern in the individual parameter estimates for local recognition revealed a significant interaction of probe type (negative vs. intrusion) with age, F(1, 147) ϭ 9.20, p ϭ .003, p 2 ϭ .059. This interaction reflects the specific difficulty of old adults with intrusion probes, that is, their increased intrusion costs, at the level of drift rates. A similar pattern is apparent in the modified Sternberg task and the local recognition task when young adults with low WMC are compared with those with high WMC. The interaction between probe type (negative vs. intrusion) and WMC as the covariate just failed the conventional level of significance in an analysis of the individual parameter estimates of local recognition, F(1, 117) ϭ 3.21, p ϭ .076, p 2 ϭ .027. The correlation of WMC with intrusion costs, calculated as the difference in drift rates on negative and intrusion probes, was Ϫ.16.
A final observation regards biases. The z parameter was consistently above the midpoint between the two decision boundaries (i.e., 0 and a). Because the upper boundary was defined as reflecting yes responses, this means that participants started the decision process with a bias toward responding yes. In case of the n-back task, this bias was even more pronounced for the intrusion probes than for the other probes, consistent with the idea that an early but misleading familiarity signal can be reflected in the diffusion model by a starting point biased toward yes. This pattern, however, was not observed consistently for the other tasks.
Discussion
Experiment 2 yielded four important results. First, in all three conflict recognition tasks, intrusion costs in RTs were disproportionately larger in old than in young adults. This replicates and extends the previous results of Oberauer (2001) and Zacks et al. (1996) . In two of the three tasks, intrusion costs in errors were associated with WMC differences among young adults. This replicates and extends the findings from Experiment 1. For the third task, the n-back task, a correlation between WMC and accuracy on positive probes was observed instead. The n-back task differed from the other recognition tasks in that only 25% (instead of 50%) of the stimuli were positive. This might have induced a bias toward rejecting stimuli. Such a bias would support correct rejection of intrusion probes at the cost of missing positive probes. Participants with low ability to distinguish between positive and intrusion probes through recollection would therefore show this deficit mainly as false alarms on intrusion probes in the modified Sternberg and the local recognition tasks but predominantly as misses in the n-back task. If this speculation is correct, then accuracy on the positive trials in the n-back task might reflect largely the same variance as accuracy on intrusion trials in the other two tasks, and this could explain the pattern of correlations with WMC.
At any rate, the correlation of intrusion costs with age and with WMC was not restricted to the modified Sternberg task but extended at least to the local recognition task. The local recognition task was designed as a conflict task that requires bindings between content and (spatial) context, but no inhibition of irrelevant contents. Thus, the present results support the hypothesis that age differences and capacity differences in conflict recognition tasks are due to deficits in binding, not in inhibition. The regression analysis performed in the context of the first structural equation model confirms this conclusion: The modified Sternberg task shared no variance with WMC that was not also shared with recollection in the local recognition task.
A second important finding is that, consistently over all three tasks, old adults' problem with rejecting intrusion probes was manifested exclusively in RTs, whereas that of young adults with low WMC was shown exclusively in errors. This replicates a similar tendency observed in Experiment 1. The simplest explanation for this difference is that old adults applied a more conservative speed-accuracy trade-off criterion than young adults. Therefore, their problems with rejecting intrusion probes were manifested only in longer latencies. (Note that, because old adults did not surpass young adults' accuracy in the conflict recognition tasks, the difference in speed-accuracy trade-off does not jeopardize the interpretation of the group differences.) Within the group of young adults, in contrast, participants with high and with low WMC used the same, less conservative speed-accuracy criterion. Therefore, difficulties with intrusion probes in the low-WMC group were apparent only in error rates.
This interpretation is corroborated by the analyses of RT distributions through the diffusion model. Differences between age groups emerged, among others, in the decision boundary parameter, which governs speed-accuracy trade-off. No age differences were observed in overall drift rate, which reflects the speed of information processing in the decision phase, but old adults showed a larger drop in drift rate from negative to intrusion probes. Young adults with low WMC also tended to have smaller drift rates on intrusion probes than those with high WMC, but in contrast to the old adults, they did not compensate for this through a more conservative decision criterion, so that their less efficient processing of intrusion probes resulted in more errors instead of longer latencies.
The third important finding is that familiarity and recollection could be dissociated in a structural equation model using local and global recognition. The two-factor model (Model 1a) provided a much better fit than a single-factor model integrating all dЈ measures from both tasks. Familiarity and recollection have been dissociated by a large number of experimental, neuropsychological, and cognitive neuroscience studies (for a review, see Yonelinas, 2002) , as well as age-comparative studies (for a review, see Light, Prull, La Voie, & Healy, 2000) , but to the best of my knowledge, this dissociation has never been tested in a factor analytic study. Thus, the present results provide new additional support for dual-process models of recognition.
Fourth, the structural equation models provide an integrated picture of the relationship between accuracy in recognition tasks and WMC. Indicators of recognition performance seem to be related to WMC to the degree that they reflect recollection. The relatively pure measures of recollection, dЈ(i), were strongly correlated with WMC in Models 1 and 2. The dЈ(n) measures, which reflect a mixture of familiarity and recollection, were correlated with WMC to a lesser degree (Model 3). Finally, the familiarity factor extracted from the residuals of dЈ(n) measures after the variance they shared with dЈ(i) had been removed was not correlated at all with WMC (Model 1).
General Discussion
The main goal of this work was to address three questions: (a) What is the nature of variation in WMC? (b) Is the diminished functioning of working memory in old adults comparable to that of young adults with low measures of WMC? (c) Do short-term recognition tasks, in particular conflict recognition paradigms, capture the same variance as recall-based measures of WMC? The results of the two studies certainly do not provide definite answers to these questions, but they offer information bearing on all three of them.
Regarding the first question, I focused on two hypotheses. One is the idea that old adults and other groups with a relatively low level of cognitive functioning have problems with inhibiting irrelevant information in working memory, thereby leaving less capacity for relevant information. The other is the hypothesis that low WMC results from a deficit in building and maintaining bindings between representations in working memory. I used intrusion costs in conflict recognition paradigms as a test case. Age differences as well as WMC differences in intrusion costs were not limited to the modified Sternberg task, in which participants could use the time between cue and probe to inhibit representations of the irrelevant list elements in LTM. They were also observed with the local recognition task that involved no opportunity to use inhibition of irrelevant information to reduce the misleading familiarity of intrusion probes. Thus, age and WMC differences in intrusion costs are most likely not due to a genuine deficit in inhibition. They are better interpreted as deficits in bindings between content and context representations. If these bindings are not quickly available for recollection, the misleading familiarity of intrusion probes drives the response selection process further in the wrong direction-toward a yes response-before recollection can overcome it and lead to a successful rejection. Hedden and Park (2003) recently came to the same conclusion regarding age differences (see also Lövdén, 2003) . This is not to say that there is no inhibition deficit in old age. Convergent evidence from various experimental paradigms strongly suggests that old adults are impaired in at least some forms of cognitive inhibition (Hasher et al., 1999) . The present data speak not to the inhibition-deficit hypothesis in general but to the specific hypothesis that old adults' decline in working memory performance is due to an overload of working memory with irrelevant materials. The same holds for the WMC contrast. There is good evidence that low WMC is associated with an inhibition deficit in some situations (e.g., Conway, Cowan, & Bunting, 2001) , but this inhibition deficit is not responsible for the problems people with low WMC have with the present conflict recognition tasks.
The binding hypothesis implies that cognitive tasks are correlated with standard measures of WMC to the extent that they rely on bindings. In the domain of short-term recognition tasks, this means that performance correlates with WMC to the degree that it relies on recollection. The structural equation models clearly support this conjecture. Factors reflecting the pure contribution of recollection (Models 1 and 2) were correlated higher with WMC than a factor reflecting a mixture of recollection and familiarity (Model 3), and a factor reflecting purely the residual variance due to familiarity (Model 1) was not related to WMC at all. These results are particularly strong because they demonstrate an experimental effect on correlations. The contrast between global and local recognition constitutes an experimental manipulation of the need for bindings. The difference in correlations with WMC can be unambiguously attributed to the experimental variation that distinguishes local from global recognition, which varies the need to rely on bindings without changing other features of the task. The results therefore provide strong support for the hypothesis that WMC reflects the limited capacity for maintaining temporary bindings (Oberauer et al., in press ).
As to the second question, are the effects of aging and of low WMC on the processes involved in the present experimental paradigms equivalent? Yes and no. On the one hand, the pattern of the WMC contrast over three experimental effects matched that of the age contrast very well: (a) Both young adults with low WMC and old adults (with even lower WMC) had inflated intrusion costs; (b) relevant-set size effects were largely unaffected by both age and WMC; and (c) the decline of irrelevant-set size effects over CSI in the modified Sternberg task was weakly, if at all, affected by age and WMC. The age contrast and the WMC contrast differed, however, in that old adults showed an increase in intrusion costs exclusively in RTs, whereas young adults with low WMC showed it largely (Experiment 1) or exclusively (Experiment 2) in error rates. The most straightforward explanation for this finding is that old adults operate with a more conservative speed-accuracy trade-off criterion. That is, they take more time for processing the stimuli, thereby increasing accuracy at the expense of speed. The analysis of RT distributions through the diffusion model supports this interpretation. Other research has provided converging evidence for more conservative speed-accuracy criteria in old age (Ratcliff et al., 2004; G. A. Smith & Brewer, 1995) . Thus, although old adults and young people with low WMC might have very similar cognitive deficits relative to high-WMC people, their behavior differs. This complicates age comparisons on cognitive functions, because old adults might sometimes operate with nonoptimal speed-accuracy criteria, trading relatively large amounts of time for little or no increase in accuracy because they already are close to the asymptote of the speed-accuracy trade-off function (G. A. Smith & Brewer, 1995) . Fitting formal models that integrate information on speed and accuracy such as timeaccuracy functions (Oberauer & Kliegl, 2001 ) or the diffusion model (Ratcliff et al., 2004) can help to solve this problem.
The third question regards the construct validity of short-term recognition tasks as indicators of WMC. The structural equation models revealed that the recognition paradigms used here share a substantial amount of variance that can be broken down-by appropriate contrasts-into variance due to familiarity and variance due to recollection. Only the latter is correlated with WMC. Nonetheless, the relationship between recall-based WMC tasks and the efficiency of recollection was clearly less than would be expected if these variables reflected the same construct. One reason for this could be that the method of assessment (recall or recognition) contaminates WMC variables with measurement variance. In any case, researchers investigating working memory with recognition paradigms such as the n-back task or the modified Sternberg task should be aware that they might not measure the same source of variance-or better, mix of such sources-as is reflected in standard WMC measures such as reading span. This holds even more for recognition tasks that do not rely as much on recollection as the conflict paradigms. The original Sternberg (1969) task as well as Stimulus 1-Stimulus 2 paradigms, in which the second stimulus is compared to the first after a delay, can make use of the familiarity difference between positive and new probes and therefore probably do not rely much on the limited capacity of working memory.
In conclusion, the present results provide strong support for the hypothesis that WMC reflects to a substantial degree the ability to maintain bindings between content and context representations and to access them quickly. The same factor also contributes to age differences in cognitive functions, and this could be an important cause of the decline of WMC in old age. Short-term recognition tasks imposing a conflict between familiarity and recollection are one way to isolate temporary bindings in working memory. Consequently, performance on these tasks correlates with WMC if it relies heavily on recollection. Even then, recognition tasks reflect substantial interindividual variance that is not shared with conventional recall-based measures of WMC. One task for future research is to disentangle the variance due to capacity from the variance due to retrieval method (recall vs. recognition) in measures of WMC.
